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Hempel seems to hold the following three views: (H1) Understanding is pragmatic/relativistic: Whether one
understands why X happened in terms of Explanation E depends on one's beliefs and cognitive abilities; (H2)
Whether a scientific explanation is good, just like whether a mathematical proof is good, is a nonpragmatic and
objective issue independent of the beliefs or cognitive abilities of individuals; (H3) The goal of scientific expla-
nation is understanding: A good scientific explanation is the one that provides understanding. Apparently, H1, H2,
and H3 cannot be all true. Some philosophers think that Hempel is inconsistent, while some others claim that
Hempel does not actually hold H3. I argue that Hempel does hold H3 and that he can consistently hold all of H1,
H2, and H3 if he endorses what I call the “understanding argument.” I also show how attributing the understanding
argument to Hempel can make more sense of his D-N model and his philosophical analysis of the pragmatic aspects
of scientific explanation.Carl Hempel (1965) is well known for holding the following two
views: (H1) Understanding is pragmatic/relativistic in the following
sense: Whether one understands why P happened in terms of Explanation
E depends on one's beliefs and cognitive abilities. Thus, a scientific
explanation that enables S1 to understand might fail to enable S2 to
understand. (H2) Whether a scientific explanation is good, just like
whether a mathematical proof is good, is a nonpragmatic/objective issue.
It is independent of the beliefs and cognitive abilities of individuals. For
example, whether Einstein's explanation of the photoelectric effect is
good is independent of my or your beliefs and cognitive abilities. It is an
objective issue.
However, Hempel seems to also hold (H3), that the goal of scientific
explanation is understanding: A good scientific explanation is the one
that provides understanding. He writes, “All scientific explanation …
seeks to provide a systematic understanding of empirical phenomena by
showing that they fit into a nomic nexus” (Hempel, 1965, p. 488).
Apparently, H1, H2, and H3 cannot be all true: if understanding is
pragmatic/relativistic, and whether a scientific explanation is good is a
nonpragmatic/objective issue, then it is not the case that a good scientific
explanation is the one that provides understanding. So, Hempel seems
inconsistent. Call it the “Hempel puzzle.”
There have been two responses to this puzzle. On the one hand, some
philosophers suggest that Hempel is indeed inconsistent. For instance,
Trout (2002, p. 217) thinks while Hempel is a trenchantly objectivist (in
that he holds both H1 and H2), he is “tempted by the allure of internal
access” and thereby endorses H3. Yet H1, H2, and H3 cannot be all true.ingminghu@nju.edu.cn.
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On the other, some philosophers (e.g., Baumberger, Beisbart, Brun, &
Christoph Baumberger, 2017, de Regt, 2009a, b; 2017) agree that H1,
H2, and H3 cannot be all true, but they claim that Hempel does not
actually endorse H3. For example, on Henk W. de Regt's interpretation,
Hempel makes a distinction between subjective understanding and
objective understanding: “As far as subjective understanding is con-
cerned, Hempel thus reduces it to ‘rational expectation.’ … From a
philosophical perspective, …the only legitimate form of scientific un-
derstanding is … objective understanding …, [which is] nothing else
than explanation of phenomena by subsuming them under covering
laws” (De Regt, 2017, pp. 49–50). Elsewhere he states, “Insofar as ob-
jectivists [like Hempel] are willing to discuss scientific understanding,
they identify it with explanation, thereby making it redundant” (de Regt,
2009a, p. 587). If Hempel identifies objective/scientific understanding
with scientific explanation, he cannot really hold the view that the goal of
scientific explanation is objective/scientific understanding. Nor does
Hempel hold that subjective understanding is the goal of scientific
explanation according to de Regt, who claims that for Hempel, subjective
understanding is pragmatic/relativistic and thus “irrelevant to the phi-
losophy of science” (de Regt, 2009a, p. 586).
In this paper, I will argue, against both responses, that Hempel does
hold H3 and may consistently hold all of H1, H2, and H3. My plan is as
follows. First, I will argue, pace de Regt et al., that Hempel does not reduce
scientific understanding to scientific explanation. Instead, Hempel holds
that scientific explanation aims at scientific understanding. Next, I will
argue that if Hempel endorses what I call the “understanding argument,”
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Hempel puzzle is dissolved. Finally, I will provide two further reasons why
Hempel ought to endorse the understanding argument: (a) Endorsing this
argument can help Hempel explain why his D-N model states necessary
and sufficient conditions for good scientific explanation. In particular, it
can helpHempel address some classic objections to theD-Nmodel. (b) The
understanding argument can make more sense of Hempel's philosophical
analysis of the pragmatic aspects of scientific explanation.
1. Understanding as the goal of explanation
On Hempel's view, an explanation consists of two parts: the explan-
andum and the explanans. An explanandum is a sentence describing the
phenomenon to be explained, and the explanans are the sentences
adduced as explanations of that phenomenon. Consider the following
explanation: (P) Baby Jane has Down's Syndrome because (B) her cells
have three copies of chromosome 21, and (L) any infant whose cells have
three copies of chromosome 21 has Down's Syndrome. P is the explan-
andum. B and L are the explanans.
Hempel explicitly and repeatedly states that scientific explanation
aims at understanding. As we have seen above, he says, “All scientific
explanation … seeks to provide a systematic understanding of empirical
phenomena by showing that they fit into a nomic nexus” (Hempel, 1965,
p. 488). Here are a few more passages where he makes the same point:
 What scientific explanation… aims at is… an objective kind of insight
that is achieved by a systematic unification, by exhibiting the phenom-
ena as manifestations of common underlying structures and processes
that conform to specific, testable, basic principles (Hempel, 1966, p. 83).
 Scientific explanation is not aimed at creating a sense of familiarity
with the explanandum; “reduction to the familiar” is at best an inci-
dental aspect of it. The understanding it conveys lies rather in the
insight that the explanandum fits into, or can be subsumed under, a
system of uniformities represented by empirical laws or theoretical
principles (Hempel, 1965, p. 488).
 A class of phenomena has been scientifically understood to the extent
that they can be fitted into a testable, and adequately confirmed,
theory or a system of laws; and the merits of functional analysis
[which is a kind of scientific explanation often employed in biology
and psychology] will eventually have to be judged by its ability to
lead to this kind of understanding (Hempel, 1965, p. 329).
In these passages, Hempel claims that the goal of scientific explana-
tion is scientific understanding: Whether a scientific explanation is good
depends on whether it can lead to scientific understanding. For him,
scientific understanding is not a sense of familiarity,1 but an insight
consisting in seeing the phenomenon in question as an instance of a
general pattern described by certain well-tested empirical laws (or the so-
called laws of nature). As Hempel (1965: 257) puts it, “Understanding in
the theoretical, or cognitive, sense [involves] exhibiting the phenomenon
to be explained as a special case of some general regularity.” Reconsider
the explanation of why (P) Baby Jane has Down's Syndrome: It is because
(B) her cells have three copies of chromosome 21, and (L) any infant
whose cells have three copies of chromosome 21 has Down's Syndrome.
This explanation can help us see the phenomenon that P as a special
instance of a general pattern described by the law L by providing the
information that B and L.2 Put differently, this explanation can help us1 As Hempel (1965, p. 432) nicely put it, “familiarity breeds content, but no
insight.”
2 Hempel may say – though he does not actually say – that seeing the phe-
nomenon as a special instance of a general pattern requires having relevant true
beliefs and grasping the law describing the general pattern, and to grasp a law is
to be able to apply the law to various contexts. This view is very similar to some
accounts of understanding in recent literature (for a survey, see Grimm, 2010b).
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mind in order to employ such an explanation to achieve scientific un-
derstanding. I will discuss this issue later.]
In addition, Hempel claims scientific understanding consists in
rational expectation. He writes, “Given particular circumstances and the
laws in question, the occurrence of the phenomenon was to be expected;
and it is in this sense that the explanation enables us to understand why
the phenomenon occurred” (Hempel, 1965, p. 337). Though Hempel
does not make it explicit, the idea that scientific understanding consists
in rational expectation seems to logically follow from the idea that sci-
entific understanding consists in seeing the phenomenon in question as
an instance of a general pattern in nature. Reconsider the Baby Jane case.
If through following the explanation, one sees the phenomenon that P as a
special instance of a general pattern described by the law L, then one not
only knows that the particular circumstance B and the law L but also sees
how given B, P would necessarily occur in light of L, and consequently,
one would rationally expect the occurrence of P.
To sum up, Hempel's account of scientific understanding is different
from his account of scientific explanation. On his view, scientific un-
derstanding is a psychological state of great epistemic value: It is an
insight. It consists in seeing the phenomenon in question as an instance of
a general pattern as well as rationally expecting the phenomenon (the
former seems to entail the latter). By contrast, a scientific explanation is a
set of sentences, not a psychological state. The distinction between sci-
entific understanding and scientific explanation allows him to claim that
scientific understanding is the goal of scientific explanation. Peter Lipton
(2009, p. 43) thinks “it is more natural to identify understanding with the
cognitive benefits that an explanation provides rather than with the
explanation itself.” Hempel would agree with this view. If so, de Regt's
claim (that Hempel identifies scientific understanding with scientific
explanation and thereby makes understanding redundant) is false.
2. Dissolving the Hempel puzzle
One might object that my interpretation above cannot solve the
Hempel puzzle. For if Hempel holds H3, that the goal of scientific expla-
nation is scientific understanding and that a scientific explanation is to be
evaluated in terms of this goal, then he must deny H2, that whether a
scientific explanation is good, just like whether a mathematical proof is
good, is an objective and nonpragmatic issue. He must deny it because he
endorses H1, that scientific understanding is pragmatic/relativistic. More
specifically, one scientifically understands why P happened in terms of
Explanation E just in case E enables one to see P as an instance of a
general pattern in nature and to rationally expect P. Now whether E
would enable one to see P as an instance of a general pattern in nature
and to rationally expect P depends on whether one has a prepared mind.
Put differently, in order to achieve scientific understanding in terms of E,
the mind must process the explanation in an appropriate way. If one
cannot follow E (e.g., one cannot understand what some propositions
constituting E say or see how the explanandum and explanans of E are
connected), then E would fail to enable one to see P as an instance of a
general pattern in nature and to rationally expect P. Thus, scientific un-
derstanding is pragmatic/relativistic: A scientific explanation that en-
ables S1 to scientifically understand might fail to enable S2 to
understand.
However, this objection is untenable because from the claim that a
scientific explanation is to be evaluated in terms of scientific under-
standing (which is pragmatic/relativistic), it does not necessarily follow
that whether a scientific explanation is good is a purely pragmatic/
relativistic issue. To see this, consider the following argument:
a. While the goal of scientific explanation is to provide understanding,
we may further distinguish between two different goals of scientific
explanation: the ideal goal is to provide scientific understanding to
ideal scientists, and the practical goal is to provide scientific under-
standing to real individuals including real scientists. In order for a
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explanation, the person must stand in an appropriate epistemic
relation to the explanation (cf. Grimm, 2010a; Khalifa, 2017;
Strevens, 2013). Put differently, the person must have a prepared
mind. Ideal scientists are the people who have a prepared mind: (a)
They can tell whether each proposition in the explanation in question
is true; (b) They can grasp the explanation in the following sense:
They are able to (b1) see whether the explanandum (deductively or
inductively) follows from the explanans and (b2) to apply the theory
(esp. the general statements that are supposed to describe laws)
involved in the explanation to various contexts; (c) Before hearing the
explanation, they are puzzled by the question of why the explan-
andum is the case.
b. While scientific understanding is pragmatic/relativistic, it is not
pragmatic/relativistic among ideal scientists: For any two such sci-
entists S1 and S2, an explanation that makes S1 understand would
also be able to make S2 understand.
c. An explanation is good iff it achieves the goal of explanation, yet a
scientific explanation is good in a nonpragmatic/objective sense just
in case it achieves the ideal goal: it would enable ideal scientists to
understandwhy the explanandum is the case (Compare van Inwagen's
(2006) definition of objectively good argument in terms of ideal
audience).
d. Therefore, from the claim that a scientific explanation is to be eval-
uated in terms of scientific understanding (which is pragmatic/rela-
tivistic), it does not necessarily follow that whether a scientific
explanation is good is a purely pragmatic/relativistic issue.
Call this the understanding argument. To be sure, Hempel never
straightforwardly makes this argument: He never draws an explicit
distinction between the ideal goal and the practical goal of scientific
explanation (though he seems to suggest such a distinction when
(Hempel, 1965, p. 426) writes, “This ideal intent suggests the problem of
constructing a nonpragmatic concept of scientific explanation”), and he
never employs the concept of “ideal scientists” to make sense what he
calls “scientific/objective understanding.” Yet endorsing the under-
standing argumentwould make Hempel's account of scientific explanation
and understanding more coherent: By endorsing this argument, Hempel
can consistently hold H1, H2, and H3, and accordingly, the Hempel puzzle
is dissolved. Moreover, as I shall argue in Section 3& 4, the understanding
argument would also make more sense of Hempel's D-N model and his
analysis of the pragmatic aspects of scientific explanation.
3. The D-N model
In this section, I will show that if Hempel endorses the understanding
argument, his D-N model would make more sense. James Woodward
(1984, p. 233) claims that a theory of explanation “ought to identify the
structural features of such explanation which function so as to produce
understanding in the ordinary user.” I will argue that Hempel's theory of
explanation – the D-N model – can be interpreted as one that identifies
“the structural features of such explanation which function so as to
produce understanding” in the ideal scientists.3 Thus interpreted, Hem-
pel would be in a better position to explain why the D-N model describes
necessary and sufficient conditions and thereby to address some classic
objections to the model.
Before turning to the arguments, a brief introduction to the D-N3 To be sure, de Regt also notes that the D-N model is related to a conception
of understanding based on unification, as he writes, “a scientific explanation of a
phenomenon provides understanding because it allows us to see the phenome-
non as an instance of a general pattern, rather than as merely an isolated event”
(De Regt, 2017, p. 51). Still, he insists that Hempel excludes the psychological
elements of scientific understanding (i.e., expecting and seeing) and identifies it
with explanation.
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satisfy the following four conditions:
 (R-1): It must take a form of deductively valid or inductively strong
argument;
 (R-2): The explanansmust contain general laws, which are required to
satisfy R-1;
 (R-3): The explanans must have empirical content and must be
testable;
 (R-4): The sentences of the explanansmust be true (Hempel, 1965, pp.
247–248).
This is known as the D-N model.4 Reconsider the explanation: (P)
Baby Jane has Down's Syndrome because (B) her cells have three copies
of chromosome 21, and (L) any infant whose cells have three copies of
chromosome 21 has Down's Syndrome. Suppose B and L are both true.
Then this explanation meets all four conditions. So, it is a good scientific
explanation according to the D-N model.3.1. Why the D-N model describes necessary conditions
Hempel holds that each of the four conditions R1–R4 of the D-N
model is necessary for good scientific explanation. But why are they
necessary? For instance, why must a good scientific explanation invoke
general laws? Hempel provides no answer. I will argue that endorsing the
understanding can help Hempel answer this question: An explanation
that fails to meet any of the four conditions cannot enable us to achieve
scientific understanding.
First, according to the D-N model, a good scientific explanation must
satisfy R-1 – it must take a form of deductively valid or inductively strong
argument – because if it is neither deductively valid nor inductively
strong, then we cannot rationally expect the explanandum-phenomenon
on the basis of the explanans. But scientific understanding (in terms of a
certain scientific explanation) consists in rationally expecting the phe-
nomenon on the basis of the explanans (as well as seeing the phenome-
non in question as an instance of a general pattern). Thus, if an
explanation is neither deductively valid nor inductively strong, then we
cannot achieve scientific understanding through following the
explanation.
Second, the D-N model requires R-2, that the explanans must contain
general laws, for general laws describe general patterns in nature. If an
explanation does not contain any general laws, then it cannot enable us to
see the phenomenon in question as an instance of a general pattern, and
thereby we cannot achieve scientific understanding through following
the explanation.
Justifying R2 in terms of scientific understanding can help Hempel
address the classic objection that some good explanations do not involve
any general laws. Consider the following case originally provided by
Michael Scriven:
INK: As you reach for the dictionary, your knee catches the edge of the
table and thus turns over the ink-bottle, the contents of which proceed
to run over the table's edge and ruin the carpet. If you are subsequently
asked to explain how the carpet was damaged you have a complete
explanation. You did it, by knocking over the ink. The certainty of this
explanation is primeval. It has absolutely nothing to do with your
knowledge of the relevant laws of physics; a cave-man could supply the
same account and be quite as certain of it (Quoted fromHempel, 1965,
p. 360).4 Hempel calls his account of scientific explanation the “covering laws models
of explanation.” He distinguishes between three models, i.e., the deductive-
nomological model, the inductive-statistical model, and the deductive statisti-
cal model. Following the convention, I will call Hempel's account of scientific
explanation the D-N model for short.
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model, because the explanation – that the carpet was stained because the
table, with an open bottle of ink standing on it, was caught and lifted by
my knee – “might be paraphrased by saying that there are laws con-
necting the presence of an ink stain on the rug with certain antecedent
circumstances, which include an open bottle of ink standing on the table,
and the fact that the table's edge was lifted” (Hempel, 1965, pp.
361–362). This response makes some sense, but it does not answer why
laws are necessary for a good explanation: The fact that the explanation
can be paraphrased in terms of laws does not show that laws are neces-
sary to make the explanation good.
Endorsing the understanding argument can help Hempel answer this
question: Laws are necessary for a good scientific explanation because
scientific explanation aims at scientific understanding, which consists in
seeing the phenomenon in question as an instance of a general pattern
described by the laws. If an explanation does not involve any laws, then it
does not refer to any general pattern in nature, and accordingly, it cannot
enable us to see the phenomenon in question as an instance of a general
pattern.
This answer does not imply that all good explanations involve laws,
for it does not say that only scientific explanations are good. It allows the
possibility that some non-scientific explanations that do not involve laws
are good. Thus, it is better for Hempel to say that if the explanation in the
INK is supposed to be a good scientific explanation, then it must be
capable of being paraphrased in terms of laws, “for scientific research
seeks to account for empirical phenomena by means of laws” (Hempel,
1965, p. 426). But if it is supposed to be a good non-scientific explanation
that a cave-man can give, then the fact that it does not involve laws poses
no challenge to the D-N model, which is an account of good scientific
explanation.
Third, the D-N model requires R-3, that the explanans must have
empirical content and must be capable of test, because if the explanans
does not have empirical content or is untestable, then no observation
statements can be deduced or induced from the explanans.5 If no
observation statements can be deduced or induced from the explanans,
then we cannot rationally expect any phenomenon on the basis of the
explanans, and thereby we cannot achieve scientific understanding
through following the explanation.
Finally, on the D-N model, the sentences of the explanans must be
true, because scientific understanding is factive. The explanans consists
of a set of statements describing the relevant general laws and back-
ground conditions. If the statements describing the general laws are not
even approximately true, then the general pattern does not exist, and
accordingly, the explanation fails to show that the phenomenon in
question is an instance of a general pattern in nature. If the statements
describing the general laws are true (i.e., the general pattern exists), but
the statements describing the background conditions are false, then the
explanation also fails to show that the phenomenon in question in-
stantiates a general pattern.63.2. Why the D-N model describes sufficient conditions
Hempel holds that the D-N model describes not only necessary
conditions for good scientific explanation but also sufficient conditions.
Why does he think the D-N model describes sufficient conditions?
Again, Hempel provides no straightforward answer. I argue that
endorsing the understanding can help Hempel answer this question. A5 James Fetzer (2017) notes, “Hempel recognized that (R-3) was a redundant
condition, since it would have to be satisfied by any explanation that satisfied
(R-1) and (R-2). Insofar as the explanandum describes an event that occurred
during the history of the world, its derivation thereby implies the explanans has
empirical content.”
6 Clearly, Hempel is not an instrumentalist. For an interesting instrumentalist
account of scientific understanding, see Rowbottom (2019).
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enable all ideal scientists to achieve scientific understanding. The four
conditions of the D-N model are sufficient for an objectively good sci-
entific explanation, because any explanation meeting the four condi-
tions will enable all ideal scientists to achieve scientific understanding.
More specifically, ideal scientists are able to grasp a D-N explanation
and recognize that the explanans are all true. Thus, a D-N explanation
will enable them to see the explanandum as an instance of a general
pattern as well as rationally expect the explanandum. Put differently,
they can achieve scientific understanding through following a D-N
explanation.
In what follows, I will show that endorsing the understanding can also
help Hempel address two classic objections to the claim that the D-N
model describes sufficient conditions for good scientific explanation.
3.2.1. Objection 1
FLAGPOLE: One can derive the length l of the shadow cast by a
flagpole from the conjunction of the following three things: the height h
of the pole, the angle θ of the sun above the horizon, and the law of the
rectilinear propagation of light. On the other hand, one can also derive h
from l and θ and the same law. Both derivations meet the DN criteria.
While the former seems explanatory, the latter does not seem so
(Bromberger, 1966).
3.2.2. Analysis
FLAGPOLE is widely regarded as a counterexample to the claim that
the D-N model describes sufficient conditions for good scientific
explanation. As Marc Lange (2016, p. 233) notes, “there is widespread
agreement that various other arguments are not explanatory—examples
so standard that I need only give their familiar monikers, such as ‘the
flagpole’.” Lange seems to suggest that any good account of explanation
must respect our intuition that the derivation of the height of the
flagpole is not an explanation. But apparently, the D-N model implies
that the derivation of the height of the flagpole is a good scientific
explanation.
In fact, Hempel expects this objection when he discusses an example
similar to FLAGPOLE:
PENDULUM: The law for the simple pendulum makes it possible not
only to infer the period of a pendulum from its length, but also
conversely to infer its length from its period; in either case, the
inference is of the form (D-N). Yet a sentence stating the length of a
given pendulum, in conjunction with the law, will be much more
readily regarded as explaining the pendulum's period than a sentence
stating the period, in conjunction with the law, would be considered
as explaining the pendulum's length (Hempel, 1965, pp. 352–353).
Hempel offers a debunking explanation why people have the intuition
that the derivation of the pendulum's length does not explain: It is
because people are more familiar with causal explanations – the expla-
nations that “exhibit the explanandum event as having been brought
about by earlier occurrences” – so that they believe “no event can be said
to have been brought about by factors some of which were not even
realized at the time of its occurrence” (Hempel, 1965, p. 353). Given this
belief, people tend to think that if X and Y are simultaneous, or X
happened after Y, then X does not explain Y.
Hempel agrees that if X and Y are simultaneous, or X happened after
Y, then X does not causally explain Y, but he does not think it necessarily
follows that X does not explain Y, for not all explanations are causal.
Hempel (1962, p. 12) writes, “Causal explanation is
deductive-nomological in character…. The converse does not hold: there
are deductive-nomological explanations which would not normally be
counted as causal.” He distinguishes between two kinds of non-causal
explanations that fit the D-N model. First, the explanandum of a D-N
explanationmight be a law. Hempel thinks the subsumption of laws, such
as Galileo's or Kepler's laws, under more comprehensive laws is “clearly
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facts or events, and not in reference to universal facts as expressed by
general laws” (Hempel, 1962, p. 12). Second, Hempel (1965: 352) claims
that “even when used to account for individual events, D-N explanations
are not always causal.”7 Here is one of several examples he offers:
For example, the fact that a given simple pendulum takes 2 s to
complete one full swing might be explained by pointing out that its
length is 100 cm, and that the period t (in seconds), of any simple
pendulum is connected with its length l (in centimeters) by the law
that t ¼ 2π√l/g, where g is the acceleration of free fall. (ibid.)
Hempel thinks this is a mathematical explanation rather than a causal
explanation. For causal explanation presupposes laws of succession, which
concern temporal changes in a system. But the law that t ¼ 2π√l/g “ex-
presses a mathematical relationship between the length and the period
(which is a quantitative dispositional characteristic) of the pendulum at
one and the same time” (ibid.). Laws of this kind are called laws of
coexistence. Clearly, in the case of the pendulum, only a law of coexistence
is invoked, so “one surely would not say that the pendulum's having a
period of 2 s was caused by the fact that it had a length of 100 cm” (ibid.).8
In light of the above analysis, Hempel would say that the FLAGPOLE
is not a counterexample to the D-N model, because our intuition that the
derivation of the height of the flagpole is not an explanation is unreliable.
This intuition comes from our belief that all explanations are causal and
that the length of the shadow of the flagpole does not causally explain its
height. But the belief that all explanations are causal is false. It is worth
noting some philosophers (e.g., De Regt & Dieks, 2005) offer a similar
debunking explanation of the FLAGPOLE.9
Given Hempel's debunking explanation of the intuition, he would
provide the following analysis though he never makes it explicit: the
FLAGPOLE can be interpreted in two ways. First, one might ask a causal
question: Why was this flagpole made h feet tall? Second, one might
literally ask a geometrical and thus non-causal question: Given that the
flagpole has a height, and space is Euclidean, why is the measure of the
height h feet? If one asks the causal question, then clearly the derivation
of the height of the pole is not an explanation. But if one asks the
geometrical question, then it is plausible to say the derivation of the
height of the pole is an explanation (cf. Levin & Levin, 1977, p. 294).
However, one might object that even though some explanations are
non-causal, it does not follow that the derivation of the height of the pole7 It is worth noting that while some philosophers (e.g., Salmon, 1984 and
Lewis, 1986) hold that no explanations of particular events are non-causal,
recently, few philosophers have affirmed this view, as Bradford Skow (2014)
notes. Rather, many philosophers hold that some explanations of particular
events are non-causal (cf. Reutlinger and Saatsi, 2018). Skow (2014) attempts to
swim against the current. But Finnur Dellsen (2016) argues that Skow's argu-
ments fail. In his book Because Without Cause, Marc Lange (2016) proposes
philosophical accounts of many kinds of non-causal explanations in science and
mathematics.
8 Thus, Jaegwon Kim (2010, p. 195) does not get Hempel right when he
writes, “In fact, we can think of Hempel's D-N model of explanation (when
applied to individual events) as giving a sort of Humean nomological analysis of
causal relations.”
9 For example, De Regt and Dieks (2005, p. 164) writes, “We hold that it
depends on the context whether the length of the flagpole makes it under-
standable how long the shadow is, or vice versa. … … The commonsense
intuition of asymmetry is based upon a preference for everyday causal
reasoning” that “singles out earlier events as the causes of what happens later.”
Like Hempel, de Regt and Dieks find this intuition misleading, for “causal ex-
planations do not possess a unique position in modern science,” and “even if
preference is given to causal reasoning, physical science does not automatically
fit in with everyday causal thinking and does not always single out earlier events
as the causes of what happens later” (ibid.). De Regt and Dieks agree with van
Fraassen that in particular contexts the length of the flagpole can be explained
by the length of the shadow (van Fraassen, 1980, pp. 130-134).
168in the FLAGPOLE (as well as the derivation of the pendulum's length in
the PENDULUM) is a non-causal explanation. As I noted earlier, Marc
Lange (2016) suggests that any good account of explanation must respect
people's intuition that the derivation of the height of the flagpole is not an
explanation, though he argues that there are mathematical explanations
that are non-causal.
Hempel's response is twofold. First, he considers some arguments
for the view that the derivation of the pendulum's length in
PENDULUM does not explain why the pendulum is of a certain length,
and he contends that these arguments are fallacious (Hempel, 1965,
pp. 352–353). I will not rehearse these arguments and Hempel's re-
buttals here, for they are complicated and not relevant to the goal of
this section.
Second, Hempel suggests an account of what makes a derivation/
inference explanatory: “The laws connect the explanandum event with
the particular conditions cited in the explanans, and this is what confers
upon the latter the status of explanatory (and, in some cases, causal)
factors in regard to the phenomenon to be explained” (Hempel, 1962, p.
12). He makes a similar point in Aspects (1965: 425). Here, Hempel
seems to think that if an argument shows that an individual event is an
instance of a general pattern described by the laws, then it is
explanatory.
While Hempel offers no explicit argument for this view, endorsing the
understanding argument can help him make a case for the view. Specif-
ically, Hempel may argue as follows:
1. Scientific understanding without explanation is impossible.
2. Therefore, if X by itself would enable someone to achieve scientific
understanding, then X must be explanatory.
3. Scientific understanding consists in seeing the phenomenon in ques-
tion as an instance of a general pattern.
4. Therefore, if an argument shows that an individual event is an
instance of a general pattern, then it would enable ideal scientists to
achieve scientific understanding.
5. Therefore, if an argument shows that an individual event is an
instance of a general pattern, then it must be explanatory.
While Premise 1 is controversial (cf. Lipton, 2009), it is not inde-
fensible. In fact, some philosophers (e.g., Khalifa, 2017; Strevens, 2013)
explicitly defend such a view. And some philosophers (e.g., De Regt &
Dieks, 2005, p. 164) seem to endorse the idea that all
understanding-providing arguments are explanatory.
Given the above argument, all D-N arguments concerning an indi-
vidual event are (causally or non-causally) explanatory since they all
provide understanding by showing that an individual event is an instance
of a general pattern. Thus, neither the FLAGPOLE nor the PENDULUM is
a counterexample.
3.2.3. Objection 2
PREGNANCY: All males who take birth control pills regularly fail to
get pregnant. John Jones is a male who has been taking birth control pills
regularly. That is why John Jones fails to get pregnant. This reasoning
meets the DN criteria but does not seem explanatory (Salmon, 1971).
3.2.4. Analysis
Hempel would say PREGNANCY fails to meet the D-N criteria
because it does not involve a genuine law. A genuine law is required for
a good scientific explanation because, as we have seen in Section 3.1,
the goal of scientific explanation is scientific understanding, which in-
volves seeing a phenomenon as an instance of a general pattern in na-
ture, and a general pattern in nature is described by a genuine law. Thus,
if an explanation does not contain any genuine laws, then it cannot
enable us to see the phenomenon in question as an instance of a general
pattern, and thereby we cannot achieve scientific understanding
through grasping the explanation. Now intuitively, the statement that
all males who take birth control pills regularly fail to get pregnant is not
X. Hu Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 88 (2021) 164–171a genuine law: It does not describe a general pattern in nature (while “no
males can get pregnant” is a genuine law describing a general pattern in
nature).
In fact, Hempel (1965: 338–342) notes that there is an intuitive
distinction between lawlike sentences (which states genuine laws) and
non-lawlike generalizations (which does not state genuine laws). And he
thinks “giving a clear characterization of lawlike sentences” is an “impor-
tant and intriguing” problem, but “this problem has proved to be highly
recalcitrant” (Hempel, 1965, p. 338). He says he can only provide “a few
observations on certain aspects of it that are relevant also to the analysis of
scientific explanation” (ibid). Unfortunately, his “observations” are just a
bunch of objections to certain accounts of lawlike sentences proposed by
Nelson Goodman and others. He does not propose any positive account.
But this does not show that his D-N model is false. It merely shows
that it is incomplete, as Woodward (2019, Section 2.2) says, providing an
account of genuine laws is “an important item of unfinished business for
advocates of the DN model.”
4. The pragmatic aspects of scientific explanation
In the previous section, I argued that the understanding argument can
shed light on Hempel's account of the nonpragmatic aspects of scientific
explanation. In this section, I will argue that the understanding argument
can make more sense of Hempel's analysis of the pragmatic aspects of
scientific explanation. According to de Regt, “Hempel claims that un-
derstanding belongs to the pragmatic dimension of science, which is
irrelevant to the philosophical analysis of science” and “should be
ignored by philosophers” (De Regt, 2017, pp. 16–17). Pace de Regt, I will
first argue that Hempel does not dismiss the pragmatic dimension of
science as irrelevant to the philosophical analysis of science: In fact,
Hempel actually gives a philosophical analysis of some pragmatic aspects
of scientific explanation. Then I will show that endorsing the under-
standing argument can help Hempel explain why a philosophical analysis
of the pragmatic aspects of scientific explanation is necessary and
important. Finally, I will close this section by suggesting that Hempel
would agree with de Regt that what de Regt calls pragmatic under-
standing is philosophically important.
To begin with, Hempel never claims that the pragmatic aspects of
science are philosophically irrelevant. He merely argues that a significant
and nonpragmatic account of scientific explanation is possible in
response to the following objection to the D-N model:
1. All explanations including scientific explanations are inherently
pragmatic.
2. If 1, then any account of scientific explanation that does not take into
account its pragmatic aspects is hopelessly inadequate.
3. The D-N model fails to take into account the pragmatic aspects of
scientific explanation.
4. Therefore, the D-N model is hopelessly inadequate.
Hempel accepts Premise 1 of this objection. He writes, “Very broadly
speaking, to explain something to a person is to make it plain and
intelligible to him, to make him understand it. Thus construed, the word
‘explanation’ and its cognates are pragmatic terms: their use requires
reference to the persons involved in the process of explaining” (Hempel,
1965, p. 425).
But Hempel explicitly rejects Premise 2, as he writes,
To call attention to the important pragmatic facets of explanation and
to indicate the diverse procedures that may be appropriate in
different cases to dispel the perplexity reflected in someone's quest for
an explanation is not to show that a nonpragmatic model of scientific
explanation must be hopelessly inadequate, just as analogous arguments
concerning the notion of proof cannot show that nonpragmatic
models of proof must be sterile and unilluminating. As is well known,
the contrary is the case (Hempel, 1965, p. 427, my italics).169Here Hempel suggests that a significant nonpragmatic model of sci-
entific explanation is possible, for scientific explanation is similar to
mathematical proof, and a significant nonpragmatic model of mathe-
matical proof is clearly possible. But this analogical argument does not
show how it is possible.
As I have shown in the previous sections, endorsing the under-
standing argument can help Hempel explain how it is possible. While
all explanations, including scientific explanations, are inherently
pragmatic/relativistic in a sense, there is another sense in which
some scientific explanations are not pragmatic/relativistic: they are
good in that they would enable ideal scientists to achieve scientific
understanding, and for any two such scientists S1 and S2, an expla-
nation that makes S1 understand would also be able to make S2
understand.
In addition, Hempel (1965, pp. 426-427) emphasizes that to propose
a nonpragmatic model of scientific explanation is “neither to deny the
pragmatic ‘dimension’ of explanation nor to belittle its importance; nor,
of course, is it to claim that people will find an explanatory account
illuminating or satisfactory only as far as it conforms to one of the
covering-law models.” Moreover, Hempel explicitly acknowledges that
most explanations working scientists actually give are pragmatic, for
working scientists formulate their explanations “with a particular kind of
audience—and thus with particular pragmatic requirements—in mind.
This is true also of the way in whichmathematicians present their proofs”
(Hempel, 1965, p. 428). It is unlikely that he would dismiss most ex-
planations working scientists actually give as irreverent to philosophical
analysis of science.
In fact, Hempel himself gives a philosophical analysis of some prag-
matic aspects of scientific explanation. For example, following William
Dray, Hempel (1965, p. 428) draws a distinction between explaining
why-necessarily an event occurred and explaining how-possibly an event
could have occurred. He argues that while a D-N explanation might be
adequate for explaining why-necessarily an event occurred; to explain
how-possibly an event could have occurred is quite a different task, which
concerns important pragmatic aspects of explanation. Here is one of the
examples Hempel provides: If a friend tells me that his teaspoon promptly
melted when he put it into a cup of hot punch, I might ask: how could this
possibly have happened –metal does not melt at so low a temperature? On
Hempel's analysis, we normally ask how X could possibly have occurred
only if some of the beliefs we hold make it impossible, or at least highly
improbable, that X should have occurred. Accordingly, to give an
adequate “how-possible” explanation, it will be necessary to “ascertain the
empirical assumptions underlying the question and then to show either
that some of these are false or else that the questioner was mistaken in
thinking that those assumptions warranted his belief that X could not have
occurred” (Hempel, 1965, p. 428). Thus, in the teaspoon case, I ask the
how-possible question because I probably hold the false belief that no
metals will melt at the temperature of hot punch. So, if you point out that
some metals, such as Wood's alloy, do melt at the temperature of hot
punch, and that the teaspoon in question had indeed been one of those
made from Wood's alloy, then you are giving me an adequate
how-possible explanation. [Hempel notes that a similar analysis applies to
the questions taking the form “Why is it not the case that p?” People
sometimes ask questions like “Why doesn't the Leaning Tower of Pisa
topple over?”, “Why don't the antipodes fall off the earth?”, or “If reflec-
tion in a plane mirror interchanges right and left, why not also top and
bottom?” Hempel thinks all these questions might well be rephrased as
how-possible questions: “How could it possibly be the case that not-p?”]
Admittedly, Hempel emphasizes that an adequate pragmatic expla-
nation (e.g., a how-possible explanation) must address the questioner's
psychology. But his analysis is philosophical rather than purely psycho-
logical, for according to his analysis, a scientific explanation addressing a
how-possible question is adequate not simply because the audience
asking the question finds it psychologically satisfactory. Instead, as I
noted above, Hempel thinks to give an adequate how-possible explana-
tion, it will be necessary to “ascertain the empirical assumptions
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false or else that the questioner was mistaken in thinking that those as-
sumptions warranted his belief that X could not have occurred” (Hempel,
1965, p. 428). These are objective necessary conditions for adequate
how-possible explanation, for whether an assumption is true andwhether
a set of assumptions warrants (inductively support or deductively entail)
a certain belief are objective issues.10
Hempel does not explain why pragmatic scientific explanations must
also satisfy some objective conditions. Endorsing the understanding argu-
ment would help him answer this question. Specifically, there are two
goals of scientific explanation: the ideal goal is to provide scientific un-
derstanding to ideal scientists, and the practical goal is to provide scien-
tific understanding to real individuals (including real scientists). As the
ideal goal, scientific understanding is non-pragmatic/objective in the
sense that an explanation that enables an ideal scientist to acquire scien-
tific understanding will also enable other ideal scientists to acquire sci-
entific understanding. As the practical goal, scientific understanding is
pragmatic/relativistic in the sense that an explanation that enables a real
individual to acquire scientific understandingmight fail to enable another
real individual to acquire scientific understanding. Yet pragmatic/rela-
tivistic understanding and non-pragmatic/objective understanding have
the same content: it is a psychological state of great epistemic value. Now
all pragmatic scientific explanations (e.g., a how-possible explanation)
aim at providing scientific understanding to real individuals. They are to
be epistemically evaluated in terms of this goal.While individuals differ in
their beliefs and cognitive abilities, as long as they achieve a scientific
understanding of a certain phenomenon, their understanding is factive,
for it consists in seeing the phenomenon as an instance of a general
pattern. If an individual has false beliefs about a general pattern or about
how the phenomenon in question instantiates a general pattern, then she
cannot really see the phenomenon as an instance of the general pattern.
Thus, a pragmatic scientific explanation must satisfy some objective
conditions in order for the individual who grasps (and assent to) the
explanation to achieve scientific understanding.
In addition, endorsing the understanding argument would also make
more sense of Hempel's view that all adequate pragmatic scientific ex-
planations implicitly presuppose a D-N explanation (Hempel, 1965, pp.
424–425). It is because every adequate pragmatic scientific explanation
can enable some real individuals to achieve scientific understanding,
which consists in the phenomenon in question as an instance of a general
pattern. If a pragmatic scientific explanation does not implicitly pre-
suppose a D-N explanation, then it cannot enable any real individuals to
achieve scientific understanding.
Before closing this section, I'd like to suggest Hempel would also
agree with de Regt that what de Regt calls pragmatic understanding is
philosophically important. De Regt (2009a, p. 588) makes a distinction
between three different ways in which the term “understanding” can be
used in connection with scientific explanation:
 FU: feeling of understanding p ¼ the subjective psychological expe-
riences accompanying an explanation.
 UT: understanding a theory p ¼ being able to use the theory (prag-
matic understanding).
 UP: understanding a phenomenon p ¼ having an appropriate expla-
nation of the phenomenon.10 To be sure, Hempel makes the following comment on Michael Scriven's
account of explanation, “Such expressions as ‘realm of understanding’ and
‘comprehensible’ do not belong to the vocabulary of logic, for they refer to the
psychological or pragmatic aspects of explanation” (Hempel, 1965, p. 413). But
it is unclear what Hempel means by “vocabulary of logic.” This comment alone
does not support the reading that Hempel thinks philosophers should ignore the
pragmatic aspects of explanation. Rather, Hempel's analysis of pragmatic sci-
entific explanations is philosophical because it concerns the question of how to
evaluate such explanations from an epistemic point of view, as we shall see.
170According to de Regt, Hempel holds that both FU and UT belong to
pragmatic aspects of science, which he dismisses as irrelevant to phi-
losophy of science. While agreeing with Hempel that FU is philosophi-
cally irrelevant, de Regt argues that pragmatic understanding UT is
philosophically important, for it is “a crucial condition for reaching the
epistemic aim UP” (ibid.). Here is an outline of his argument:
1. Understanding a phenomenon p ¼ having an appropriate explanation
of the phenomenon.
2. To have an appropriate explanation of p, it is not enough to know
the relevant laws and the background conditions; it also requires
the ability to derive the explanandum p from the relevant laws and
background conditions. For example, de Regt (2009a, p. 588)
writes, “merely knowing Bernoulli's principle and the background
conditions is not equal to having an explanation: in addition, one
should be able to use this knowledge in the right way to derive the
explanandum. Thus, a student may have memorized Bernoulli's
principle and have all background conditions available but may
still be unable to use this knowledge to account for the fact that jets
can fly. The extra ingredient needed to construct the explanation is
a skill: the ability to construct deductive arguments from the
available knowledge.”
3. The ability to use a theory (often consisting of a set of general state-
ments describing laws) ¼ the ability to derive the empirical impli-
cations from the theory and the relevant background conditions.
4. Therefore, to understand a phenomenon p, one must be able to use
the relevant theory. That is, UT is a crucial condition for UP.
I want to suggest that Hempel would endorse de Regt's argument. For
Hempel never claims that anyone who is presented with a D-N expla-
nation of p would automatically understand why p – he does not identify
scientific understanding with D-N explanation, as I argued in Section 1.
Instead, he suggests that if one is presented with a D-N explanation of p
but unable to see how the explanandum derives from the explanans, then
one would not understand why p. As he writes, in some cases, “the
questioner may be aware of the requisite particular data and laws but
may need to be shown how the explanandum can be derived from this
information” (Hempel, 1965, p. 427). And he adds a footnote here: “the
derivation may well present considerable mathematical difficulties and
may thus be hard to discover” (ibid.). Thus, Hempel would agree that UT
is a crucial condition for UP.
5. Conclusion
In summary, Hempel seems to hold three apparently inconsistent
views: (H1) understanding is pragmatic/relativistic: Whether one un-
derstands why X happened in terms of Explanation E depends on one's
beliefs and cognitive abilities; (H2) whether a scientific explanation is
good, just like whether a mathematical proof is good, is a nonpragmatic
and objective issue independent of the beliefs or cognitive abilities of
individuals; (H3) the goal of scientific explanation is understanding: A
good scientific explanation is one that provides understanding. Some
philosophers claim that Hempel is inconsistent, while some other phi-
losophers argue that Hempel does not actually hold H3. By contrast, I
have shown that Hempel does hold H3 and that he can consistently hold
all of H1, H2, and H3 if he endorses the understanding argument. I have
also shown how attributing the understanding argument to Hempel can
make more sense of his D-N model and his analysis of the pragmatic
aspects of scientific explanation. If my analysis is correct, then it is
plausible to attribute the understanding argument to Hempel.
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